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'CHRISTIANISED REASON'?
ABELARD, HIS PEERS AND THEIR JEWISH-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUES
JASON TALIADOROS
I JEWISH-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS AND THE DIALOGUE
This paper will examine the Dialogus inter philosophum, ludaeum et christianum (Dialogue of a
Philosopher with a Jew, and a Christian) written by Peter Abelard (1079-1142) in the context
of the intellectual relations between Jews and Christians in the early to mid-twelfth
century.'
Scholars variously describe the twelfth century as a time of 'renaissance'^or
'renewal'.^ Whatever it is called, the period from the end of the eleventh century up to
the first half of the twelfth century saw an era of significant economic growth and
social change in Christian Europe. In addition, this period saw an increasing
sophistication in intellectual endeavour and a rise in Christian anti-Jewish polemic.''
Abulafia, in her study of Christians and Jews in this twelfth century 'renaissance',
argues that philosophical concepts concerning reason were 'Christianised' so that they
could be used to strengthen and further define Christian doctrine in order to exclude
Jews from the norms of Christian society.^  She distinguishes her study from that of
Moore, who theorises that a newly-educated literati denigrated Jews in the twelfth
' R. Thomas (ed.), Dialogus inter philosophum, ludaeum et christianum, Textcridsche edition, Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt, 1970; J-P. Migne, Patrologia Cursus Completus Series latina (PL), 178, cols 1609-
1682. For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to Payer's translation in Peter Abelard, A
Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew, and a Christian, P. J. Payer (tr.). Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies, Toronto, 1979 (hereafter Dialogue). Further, I will not deal with the controversy
surrounding the dating of the Dialogue; a useful summary of the competing views is to be found
in C. J. Mews, 'Peter Abelard and the Enigma of Dialogue', Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious
Toleration Before the Enlightenment, J.C. Laursen and C. J. Nederman (eds.). University of
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1998, pp. 26-27.
2 C.H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1927.
3 R.L. Benson, G. Constable and CD. Lanham (eds.). Renaissance and Renewal in the Twe^th Century,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
•• D.Berger, 'Mission to the Jews and Jewish-Christian Contacts in the Polemical Literature of the
High Middle Ages', American Historical Review, vol. 91, 1986, pp. 576-591, 577. See also J. Cohen,
'Scholarship and Intolerance in the Medieval Academy: The Study and Evaluation of Judaism in
European Christendom', American Historical Review, vol. 91, 1906, pp. 592-613, 593 and R.
Moore., Jews and Christians in the Life and Thought of Hugh of St Victor, Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1995,
pp. 2-7 and 9-15. For a study of the parallel development of anti-Christian Jewish polemic in the
commentaries of Rashbam, see E. Touitou, 'La Renaissance du 12e siècle et l'exégèse biblique de
R:\ùia2xs:î, Archives Juives, vol. 20, nos. 1 & 2,1984, pp. 3-12.
5 A. S. Abulafia, Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance, Routledge, London, 1995, pp.
123-135.
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century because diey perceived a threat by Jews to the literati's status as administrators.";
In contrast, Abulafia argues that the threat posed by Jews was that 'many of their
criticisms of Christianity were uncomfortably simUar to the growing number of
questions which began to be asked by inquiring minds within the Church.''
This paper wiU firstly examine the genre of the phUosophical dialogue typified
in the works of Ansekn and modified in the hands of a number of Abelard's twelfth
century contemporaries, namely Peter Damián, GUbert Crispin, Pseudo-WiUiam of
Champeaux, Hildebart of Lavardin, Guibert of Nogent, Odo of Cambrai, Peter Alfonsi
and Rupert of Deut2.8 It wül then analyse the Dialogue of Abelard, focussing on the first
dialogue between the Jew and the philosopher. From this, I wiU deduce something of
the uniqueness of Abelard, when seen in the context of his own works and those of his
peers, and determine whether he and they are exponents of Abulafia's 'Christianised
reason'.
II ST ANSELM AND THE TRADITION OF PHILOSOPHICAL
DIALOGUE
The genre of the philosophical dialogue as a means of developing one's ideas began in
the late eleventh century in the writing of Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109).'
Comparing Abelard's Dialogue with the dialogues inspired by Anselm enables us to
appreciate the extent of Abelard's originaUty. In Anselm's early treatises, such as De
veritate (On Truth), De casu diaboli (On the Reason for the Devil), De Libértate arbitrii (On Free
Judgment) and De grammatico (On Grammar), which were composed between
approximately 1080 and 1085, the format was that of a conversation between master
and pupu which was modeUed on the early dialogues of Augustine.'" Anselm
estabUshed the precedent of discussing issues 'from reason alone', but his concern was
not so much to eUcit ideas from different points of view as to bring out the inherent
logic of his own conclusions.
The use of the word ratio ('reason') by Abelard and his contemporaries is
linked to Abulafia's description of the 'Christianisation of reason'. In contrast to
modern notions of 'reason', which perceive it in a secular and atheistic sense, twelfth
century thinkers saw God as the supreme embodiment of reason. Thus the increasing
interest in the study of classical texts, particularly Patristic and Stoic writings, led to the
^ R. I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Westem Europe, 950-1250,
Basü BlackweU, Oxford, 1987, pp. 33-57.
' Abulafia, Christians and Jews, p. 135.
* See A. L. WiUiams, 'Adversus Judaeos': A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae' Until the
Renaissance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1935; Moore, Hugh of St. Victor, pp. 9-15.
' Note also the dialogues of Alcuin in the late eighth and early ninth century: Alcuin, Disputatio de
Rhetorica et de Virtibus sapientissimi Regis Karii et Alhini Magistri, in W. S. HoweU, (tr. and ed.). The
Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, RusseU & RusseU, New York, 1965, pp. 65-158.
'" Mews, 'Peter Abelard', p . 28.
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notion that such works would assist in finding truth." The concern of this paper is to
what extent writers used such a concept of reason to question their o-wn faith; that is,
to what extent they were prepared to go beyond the institutional doctrine of the
Church in their use of reason.
AnseUn's CurDeus Homo (Why the Cod Man), completed in 1098, was written in
the form of a dialogue between AnseUn and his friend and pupñ Boso, and had a
didactic function.'^ Cur Deus Homo sought to demonstrate the truth of human
redemption and the sinfulness of human nature and in it Boso served as the
mouthpiece of the infideles ('unbeUevers'). A number of scholars, most recently
Southern, have claimed that the unbeUevers referred to Jews, or possibly MusUms.'^
However Abulafia disagrees, on the basis that AnseUn's letters concerning Jews betray
very few references to contemporary Jews or Je-wish-Christian debates.''' In addition,
she points out that the fundamental difference between the beUevers and the
unbeUevers was that the former beUeved and whue beUeving searched for an
understanding of what they beUeved, whereas the latter group allowed itself to suspend
beUef until it understood. Therefore both groups were at least nominaUy Christian;'^
and thus the disbeUef that Anselm combated was of those who were at least nominaUy
Christian. Although Anselm hoped his process of reasoning would convince Jews and
pagans of the necessity of the Incarnation, his ideas were not formed in dialogue -with
them.
This refusal to engage in debate -with non-beUevers is evident even in the
Disputatio (Disputation) between a Christian and a Gentile."^ In what is ostensibly an
attempt to test the ideas of redemption and sin from Why the Cod Man in non-Christian
argumentation, it becomes apparent that this is not so. Although not developed with
the same subdety as his Whj the Cod Man, the underlying argument of the Disputation is
the same: given the sinfuUiess of man, who was quite unable to restore himself by his
" Abulafia, Christians and Jews, pp. 23-33.
'^ Anselm, Anselm of Canterbury, vol 3: Two Letters Concerning Roscelin, The Incarnation of the Word,
Why God Became Man, The Virgin Conception and Original Sin, The Procession of the Holy Spirit, Three
Letters on the Sacraments, J. Hopkins and H. Richardson (eds. and trans.), Edwin MeUen Press,
Toronto, 1976, pp. 39-137.
'5 R.'W. Southem, St. Anselm. A Portrait in a Landscape, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1990, pp. 198-202.
'•' A.S. Abulafia. 'St. Anselm and those Outside the Church', in D. Loades and K. Walsh (eds.)
Faith and Unity: Christian Political Experience, Studies in Church Histoty, Subsidia, 6, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, 1990, pp. 11-37.
'5 Abulafia, Christians and jews, p. 43.
"• Mews attributes this work to Anselm, noting the work had previously been absent from
cridcal edidons of Anselmian texts: C. J. Mews, 'St. Anselm and RosceUn: Some New Texts and
their ImpUcadons. I. The De incamatione Verbi and the Disputatio inter Christianum et gentilem'.
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age, vol. 58, 1991, pp. 55-97, 86-99 (text), hereafter
cited as Disputatio. Compare Abulafia, who attributes the text to Pseudo-Anselm: ]ews and
Christians, p.74.
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own efforts, the only person who could redeem mankind was someone who was
sinless, namely a man who was also God. The Chrisdan successfuUy foUows the
direcdve of the gendle to argue that God became man, without recourse to scriptural
authority." Although, in doing so, he twice aUudes to AnseHn's exhortadon to faith,
derived from Isaiah 7: 9 CUnless you beHeve, you shaU not understand'),'« diis was not
use of scriptural authority but an asserdon of the priority of faith over understanding.
Thus, while Ansekn had estabHshed a new point of departure in insisting that aU
theological inquiry be based on reason alone, rather than on written authority which
might not be acceptable to aU pardes, he never quesdoned the fundamental
Augusdnian assumpdons about the sinfulness of man and the priority of faith over
understanding.
It should be noted that Ansekn's dialogue and, indeed, the genre of the
phUosophical dialogue which his writings inspired, were not reports of actual dialogues
between Chrisdans and non-beHevers, but ardficial posidons put forward on behalf of
these pardes.'' As wiU be seen, the non-Chrisdan figure is contrived. He is the 'straw
man' to be confuted. These uses of the dialogue genre made AnseHn an exponent of
what Abulafia has termed 'Chrisdanised reason', that is the use of reason to marginaHse
Jews.
Ill SOME TWELFTH CENTURY INFLUENCES
It is now necessary to turn to Abelard's contemporaries and examine their use of
'Chrisdanised reason'. In the development of the genre of philosophical dialogue
between Jews and Chrisdans, Funkenstein idendfies four evoludonary stages: the first
reHes on the standard selecdon of testimonies from the Scriptures; the second utiHses
reason, rather than Scripture; the third uses the TaHnud against the Jews; and the
fourth uses the TaHnud to prove to Jews the tmth of Chrisdanity.2" My study goes
beyond that of Funkenstein's, for of the eight writers discussed below, he deals only
with Peter Alfonsi.
1. Peter Damián
An example of the first stage of argumentadon occurred in the works of Peter Damián
(1007-1072). Peter authored two and-Jewish treadses which reiterated die scriptural
tesdmonies and their estabHshed patrisdc interpretadons: die Antilogus contra Judaeos
(Rebuttal Against the Jews) and his Dialogus inter ludeum requirentem (Dialogue with an Inquiring
" Mews, 'Peter Abelard', p. 86.
•8 Mews, 'AnseHn and RosceHn', p. 90.
" Ahulafia, Christians and Jews, p . 73.
2° A. Funkenstein, 'Basic Types of Anti-Jewish Polemics in the Later Middle Ages', Viator, vol. 2,
1971, pp. 373-382.
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Jew).^^ Significandy, he beHeved that his bibHcal citadons would refute Jewish
arguments:
If you wish to be a soldier of Christ and fight for him courageously,
then take up arms ... against the vices of the flesh, the contrivances of
the devu — an enemy who wiU dearly never die — rather than against
the Jews, who wül soon be virtuaUy destroyed from the face of the
eardi.22
He did, however, agree to provide the material for his Rebuttal, since sUence would
cause doubts in Chrisdan minds, and, in addidon, Jews might be converted by weU-
presented Chrisdan arguments.2'
2. Gilbert Crispin
A further exponent of Funkenstein's first stage of Jewish-Chrisdan debate is Gilbert
Crispin (1046-1117). Gilbert, abbot of Westminster from 1085 to 1117, was a former
pupu of Anselm and wrote the Disputatio Iudei et Christiani (Dispute of a Jew and a
Christian) in 1092/3.2* This work, which came to recdve popular support throughout
the twelfth century, took the form of conversadons between Gilbert and a Jew.^ * As in
the Anseknian model, the figure taking issue with the Chnsdan viewpoint was an
ardficial one, as was the dialogue itself. At the outset of the discussion, GUbert
emphasised the friendly spirit in which the dispute was conducted: 'As often as we got
together we soon had a conversadon in a friendly spirit about the Scriptures and our
faith'.2^ When the Jew opened the debate, he confirmed the spirit of tolerance which
was to foUow: 'Since Chris dans claim that you are learned in letters and ready with the
faculty of speaking, I should Hke you to deal with me in a tolerant spirit'.^ ^ Thus,
Gilbert consciously distanced himself from the and-Jewish invecdve characterisdc of
Peter Damián and appeared to embrace a new spirit of tolerance brought on by the
21 PL 145, cols 41-56 and cols 57-68.
22 PL 145, col. 41; quoted in Berger, 'Mission to the Jews', p. 580.
23 ibid.
2* Gilbert Crispin, The Works of Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster, A.S. Abulafia and G.R. Evans
{eà%),Auctores BritanniaMedii Aevi, vol. 8, Oxford University Press, London, 1986, pp. 8-53.
25 A.S Abulafia, 'The ars disputandi of Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster (1085-1117)', in
C M . Cappon (ed.). Ad fontes. Opstellen aangeboden aan Professor Dr.C van der Kieft, Verloven,
Amsterdam, 1984, pp. 139-152 and A. S. Abulafia, 'An Attempt by Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of
Westminster, at Rational Argument in the Jewish-Christian Debate', Studia Monástica, vol. 26,
1984, pp.55-74.
2<5 Gilbert Crispin, Works of Gilbert Crispin, p.9.
27 ibid, p.lO.
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increasingly frequent contacts and intellectual exchanges between Christians and Jews.28
Further, in contrast to Anselm, Gilbert broke new ground in his preparedness to
engage in dialogue direcdy with non-Christians.^' However, like Peter Damián, this
dialogue is grounded on the use of scriptural authority to proselytise against the Jewish
position.
Gilbert's Disputatio Christiani cum gentili (Dispute of a Christian with a Gentile)
attempted a logical proof of Christianity without recourse to scriptural citation.3o It was
between two philosophers 'of great fame, but following different paths'; one a gentile
and the other a Christian, who were engaged in a dispute on the worship of the one
God.3' Although Gilbert introduced the figure of the gentile to raise objections to
Christian doctrine on the basis of reason alone,32 he nevertheless made reference to
Scripture in justifying his argument of the Trinity.33 The Dispute of a Christian with a
Gentile concluded with the gentile abandoning the discussion, when his place was taken
by a disciple willing to learn, rather than argue, the tmth of the doctrine of the
Trinity.'"^ Thus, for all of Gilbert's admiration of Ansekn's use of reason, he was at his
best when referring to the authority of Scripture. Further, unlike Anselm and, as
previously demonstrated in his Dispute of a Christian and a Jew, Gilbert used reason as a
tool to engage in debate with non-Christians. However, similarly to Anselm, dialogue in
the hands of Gilbert meant demonstration of the truth of a certain point of view.
3. Pseudo-William of Champeaux
Other scholars were also prepared to engage in debate with non-Christians, using both
reason and Scripture. One example was the Jewish-Christian disputation linked to the
'School at Laon'35 entided Dialogus inter Christianum et ludeum de fide Catholica (Dialogue of a
Christian and a Jew about the Catholic Faith) (1123-1148), which has been incorrecdy
28 Abulafia, 'An Attempt by Gilbert Crispin', pp. 55-1A passim.,]. Kat2, Exctusiveness and Tolerance:
Jewish-Christian Relations in Medieval and Modem Times, Oxford, 1971, p. 106.
2' C. Gale, 'From Dialogue to Disputation: St. Anselm and his Students on Disbelief, in
Tjurunga: An Australasian Benedictine Review, vol. 44, 1993, pp. 71-86, 74; Abulafia, Christians and
Jews, p. 79.
3" Gilbert Crispin, Works of Gilbert Crispin, pp. 61-87.
31 ibid., p. 62.
32 Abulafia, 'An Attempt by Gilbert Crispin', pp. 56-57.
33 Gilbert Crispin, Works of Gilbert Crispin, p. 39. See A.S. Abulafia, 'Jewish-Christian
Disputations and the Twelfth- Century Rennssisict', Journal of Medieval History, vol. 15, 1989, pp.
105-125 and Abulafia, Christians and Jews, p.78.
3'' Gilbert Crispin Works of Gilbert Crispin, p. 62.
35 Valerie Flint distinguishes 'the school of Laon' to 'the school at Laon': V. Flint, 'The 'School
of Laon': A Reconsideration', in V. Flint (ed.). Ideas in the Medieval West: Texts and their Contexts,
Variorum Reprints, London, 1988,1, pp. 89-110; V. Flint, 'Anti-Jewish Literature and Attitudes
in the Twelfth Century', in Flint (ed.). Ideas in the Meäeval West, XIV, pp. 39-57, 183-205, 186-
187.
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ascribed to WiUiam of Champeaux.^ «! The disputation borrowed heavUy from both
GUbert Crispin and Ansekn, and much use was made of scriptural authority.3^ The tone
of the debate was sharper than Gilbert's treatise: the Jew of Pseudo-WilUam's debate
was argued into a corner with nothing left to oppose the wealth of evidence from
nature and authority presented by the Christian.38 Abulafia beUeves this was due to the
'cut and thrust' atmosphere of the schools (WilUam founded the School of St. Victor in
1108), which differed from the quiet, reflective method Gilbert had inherited from
Anselm.35 Thus, the harshness of school polemics injected a hostile tone into Jewish-
Christian debate.
In addition, reason was used in the first half of the debate (in the form of
evidence taken from nature) and put to polemical use against the Jews. Thus, Pseudo-
WilUam's Jew asked his Christian counterpart how the author of nature could have a
mother, for conceiving without the seed of man was plainly unnatural. The Christian
retorted that the divine author of nature could, in fact, do things that went against
nature, and to prove the point he cited a number of Old Testament miracles in which
Jews beUeved, such as the burning bush.''*' In addition, the Christian explained that the
Virgin Birth was similar to everyday occurrences; Mary remained a Virgin in the same
way that a glass did not break when a sun's rays shone through it.''' Thus, Pseudo-
WUUam used a simile from nature to argue Christian doctrine on a rational basis,
although such a simile had its basis in Scripture.
FinaUy, foUowing a discussion of the status of the Law of Moses, original sin,
the Virgin Birth and the Trinity, the Jew agreed to open his heart to what the Christian
had to say and was able to accept the arguments the Christian would put to him
concerning the Incarnation in the second half of the dialogue.''^  Thus a norther
difference to Gilbert's disputations becomes apparent, for the last half of the dialogue
was less of a Jewish-Christian debate than an exposition on the necessity of the
Incarnation and a fuU discussion of free wül and the faU of Satan and man.
4. Hildebert of Lavardin and Guibert of Nogent
Utilising examples from nature to an even greater extent, Hñdebert of Lavardin (1056-
1133) composed two sermons which highUghted the contrast between unreasonable,
3' PL 163, cols 1045-1072. For a discussion of the authorship of this work, see Abulafia,
Christians and Jews, p. 81; Berger, 'Mission', p. 582.
3^  Abulafia, Christians and Jems, p. 81.
38 ibid.
3' ibid. For an analysis of the greater urgency of purpose with which the 'School at Laon' directed
itself towards Jewish beUefs, see FUnt, 'The "School of Laon" ', pp. 106-107 and Flint, 'Anti-,
Jewish Uterature', p. 187.
•"> Exodus 3:2; Numbers 17:23.
'" PL 163, cols 1054-1055; translated in Abulafia, Christians and Jews, p. 82.
''2 PL 163, cols 1060-1072; Abulafia, 'Jewish-Christian disputations', pp. 108, 118-121; Abulafia,
Christians and Jews, p. 81.
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camal Jews and rational, spiritual Christians.''^  Guibert of Nogent (1055-C.11125) in his
Tractatus de incamatione contra ludaeos (Treatise against the Jews on the Incamation) (c . lUl) also
attempted to convince Jews of the credibüity of the Virgin Birth by citing natural
phenomena which were visible to Jew and Christian aUke."* Again, such natural
phenomena were proven to exist by their appearance in Scripture.
5. Odo of Cambtai
A change in emphasis from nature to an examination of the internal coherency of
Je-wish Scripture is e-vident in Odo of Cambrai (c. 1050-1113) and his Disputatio contra
Iudeum Leone nomine de adventu Christi (Disputation against a Jew named Leo about the Coming of
Christ) (1106-1113).''5 This may be seen as a prototype of Funkenstein's third stage of
Je-wish-Christian debate: the use of the Talmud against the Jews. In addition to citing
examples from nature, like Hñdebert and Guibert, Odo reproduced AnseUn's careful
reasoning from Why the Cod Man in this explanation of the Incamation, which attempts
to con-vince Leo the Jew to become a Christian. However despite Leo's admission that
he had no logical counter to Odo's arguments, he persisted in his refiisal to become a
Christian on the basis that he was not prepared to give up his holy Law.'"^  Thus, Odo
daimed, it was his Law which prevented the Jew. from employing his reason. This point
is confirmed in the second part of the disputation, when Odo impUed that the Jews'
faüure to comprehend the Virgin Birth demonstrated their lack of reason.'''' Odo
proceeded to take a Chris tological interpretation of Je-wish Law, comparing the sensual
nature of its determination of uncleanUness (especiaUy notions such as the 'obscene'
womb of Mary),''^  to the judicious use of reason in the Gospel of Christ and the
teaching of his aposdes.'" Thus, Odo contrasted Jewish sense perception in Je-wish
Scripture to Christian rational understanding in the Bible.
6. Peter Alfonsi
An example of a more sophisticated use of the Talmud against the Jews in Je-wish-
Christian debate occurred in the Dialogus Petri et Moysi Judei (Dialogue with Peter and Moses
the Jew) (c.1108-1110) of Peter Alfonsi (c.l060-c.ll40). so Peter wrote his disputation as
an exchange between his former Jewish self, Moses and his present Christian state,
with the main purpose of justifying his own conversion and forging a new rational
''5 See Sermon 5: PL 171, cols 806-811 and Sermon 7: PL 171, cols 813-814.
;ols 489-528. See Abulafia, Christians and Jews, pp. 81-83.
:ols 1103-1112.
:ol. 1109.
:ols 1111-1112.
''"PL 156,
-'S PL 160,
"PL 160,
-"PL 160,
"8 PL 160,.
•"PL 160, cols 1111-1112.
S" PL 157, cols 535-672. Tolan provides this date: J. Tolan, Petrus Alfonsi and His Meäeval Readers,
University press of Florida, Gaines-viUe, 1993, p. 13 n. 1.
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basis for Chrisdan theology. UnHke Odo, who cridcised Jews' bHnd obedience to the
Old Law, Peter took objecdon to the new heredcal law of the Jews, the TaHnud.^' In
his determinadon to prove that his understanding of the Jewish Scriptures was superior
to that even of the rabbis, he selected rabbinical exegeses from the Talmud and
subjected them to scrutiny in Hght of their concurrence or otherwise with reason. Peter
accused the rabbis of attributing to God a type of corporeaHty^^ that was absurd to
Peter, since God was the Creator himself and had not been created." He demonstrated
this by quoting a number of aggadi (narradve) secdons of the TaHnud which referred to
God in anthropomorphic language. In one piece, for example, God is said to have
wept over the capdvity of the Jew. '^' Similarly, Hteral interpretadon of bibHcal verses
which referred to God's body, such as Exodus 33:23 ('you shaU see my back parts: but
my face you cannot see'), were considered to be false and at odds with reason.^^ Thus
Peter reHed on reason alone for a large part of his argumentadon against Judaism.
However in the event that authority clashed with reason, Peter maintained that
it was necessary to move away from the letter of the text and turn to aUegory.^ '' For
example, when asked by Moses why the concept of the Incarnadon did not destroy
that of the Trinity, Peter answered that, like fire, one perceived Hght without heat and
heat without Hght, even though both are integral components of fire. '^' In the same
way, Peter continued, Christ the Son was incarnated without being separate in essence
from the Father and the Holy Spirit. Moses then sought proof of this, and Peter
provided proof from Scripture. Thus, unHke Ansekn, Peter beHeved the Incarnadon
was not expHcable by reason alone, although reason did not dispute it. His message
here was twofold: firsdy, that Chrisdanity was more radonal than Judaism and that the
Jews were wrong to beHeve their rabbis when such teachings ran contrary to nature,
like Pseudo-WüHam, Hüdebert and Guibert, he looked to natural phenomena to
explain Chrisdan doctrine. Second, although Peter beHeved reason could prove the
existence of the Creator and the Trinity, proof of the Incarnadon was to be found in
Scripture.58 Thus, Peter Alfonsi perceived natural aUegory within the concept of reason,
which, in concert with the authority of Scripture, proved Chrisdan tmth.
51 Tolan, Petrus Alfonsi, p. 12.
52 PL 157, col. 543; Tolan, Petrus Alfonsi, pp. 22-23.
53 PL 157, cols 553-560.
5't PL 157, cols 541-550.
55 PL 157, col. 541.
5« PL 157, cols 552-553; see also Abulafia, Christians and Jews, pp. 92 and 100.
57 PL 157, cols 617-618; Tolan, Petrus Alfonsi, p. 39.
58 PL 157, cols 606-607; see Tolan, Petrus Alfonsi, pp. 39-40 and Abulafia, Christians and Jews, p.
92.
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7. Rupert of Deutz
Rupert of Deutz (c.1075-1129) also used Scripture, namely the Bible, extensively in his
Anulus sive dialogus inter Christianum et ludeum (Ring or Dialogue between a Christian and a Jew)
(c.ll26).*5 Attributing the crime of killing Christ to the Jews, Rupert argued that this
was carried out on account of the Jew's insadable greed - not, as had tradidonaUy been
argued, out of their ignorance of his status as the Messiah.iso But Rupert went further
than merely attributing Christ's death to the Jews. In their eagerness to keep what they
beHeved to be God's salvadon for themselves, Jews were intendonaUy unwiUing to
accept the idea that Jesus Christ had come to save the whole of mankind.^' Thus,
Rupert used the Bible to compare the idea of the universaHty of Chrisdanity to the
particularity of Judaism; expHcit polemic, rather than reason, guided him.
The Anselmian tradidon of and-Jewish philosophical dialogue was manifest in a
number of twelfth century texts. Peter Damián feU within the first stage of
Funkenstein's dassificadon, by his use of scriptural authority in an attempt to show
Jews their theological errors. Gilbert Crispin exempHfied both the first and second
stages of Funkenstein's schema, using both scriptural authority and reason. Reason sdU
reUed on faith as setting the parameters for radonal theological debate, which could
aUow only a pre-determined Christological conclusion. Pseudo-WüHam of Champeaux,
Hildebert of Lavardin and Guibert of Nogent extended reason as a polemical tool by
ddng examples from nature as demonstradve of Chrisdans truths such as the
Incarnadon and the Virgin Birth; such analogies, however, reHed upon Scripture for
proof of their existence. Although Langmuir would seem to argue that twelfth century
thinkers suppressed empirical evidence when faced with apparent incongruides
between nature and faith, Pseudo-WiUiam and HUdebert seem instead to exhibit a
desire to compare natural processes with central doctrines of the Church in a genuine
beHef in the simUarity of die two.^^ Employing different approaches, Odo of Cambrai,
Peter Alfonsi and Rupert of Deut2 contrasted Jewish and Chrisdan Scriptural authority,
concluding the superiority of the latter. Aldiough perhaps reaching die diird or fourth
of Funkenstein's evoludonary stages, dearly their concerns were more with bolstering
internal faith than with conversion.
59 PL 170, cols 559-610; Abulafia, Christians and Jem, p. 119 n. 64; J. H. van Hengen, Rjipert of
Deut^ University of California Press, Berkeley, \9%2>,passim.
"" J. Cohen, 'The Jews as the KiUers of Christ in the Latin Tradition, from Augustine to the
Friars', Traätio, vol. 39,1983, pp. 1-16.
' ' PL 170, cols ilQ-Eill; Abulafia, Christians and Jews, p. 121 n. 75.
«2 G.I. Langmuir, History, Religion andAntisemitism, CaHfomia University Press, Berkdey, 1990, pp.
275-305; G. I. Langmuir, Towards a Definition of Antisemitism, California University Press, Berkeley,
1990, pp. 100-183.
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Thus, the use of reason by Abelard's contemporaries was varied: in the hands
of some, it was not completely separate from Scriptural authority, particularly in the use
of natural sinules and the dependence on faith; in the hands of others, its use analysed
the internal coherency of Jewish texts and distinguished them from Christian Scripture.
Therefore, the examples I have used suggest that Abulafia's label of 'Christianised
reason' does not adequately portray the complexity and variety of anti-Judaic writings
in the dialogical genre. We shaU now turn to Abelard's Dialogue to see if it, too, forms
another 'variety' of the use of reason in the dialogical genre.
IV THE DIALOGUE
The Dialogue is made up of two distinct conversations, or collationes (conferences), one
of a phUosopher with a Jew, the second of a philosopher with a Christian. They are
introduced by a preface in which the narrator, Abelard himself, describes how he
dreamed that he was asked by three individuals to adjudicate their debate about which
path to take to supreme truth.
1. The First Conference: the Philosopher and the Jew
In the first conference, Abelard sets up the debate between the Jew and the
philosopher, not to estabUsh the superiority of one position over the other, but in
order to set out the rationale for Jewish observance of the Law and the arguments
from reason that it was not essential to submit to these obUgations.''^  As the dialogue
unfolds, Abelard's place amongst his Anselmian contemporaries and their use of
'Christianised reason' becomes apparent.
The phUosopher opens the first debate, echoing the concerns Odo expressed
of the Jew Leo by asking of the Jew whether it was rationality or upbringing which led
him to his faith.'''' The Jew concedes 'kin and custom' may have led Jews to their faith
initiaUy, but 'now reason rather than opinion keeps us here.'*"^
a. The Jew
The Jew then explains that Jews keep their faith because their Law was given to them
by God, and therefore it should not be disobeyed. He argues that it was reasonable to
beUeve the Law was given by God because this cannot be refuted^ f^  and furthermore, it
was reasonable that God saw fit to instruct and restrain maUce amongst his people by
fear of punishment, through a written law. FinaUy, he argues that the Jewish Law was
older than any other law and so was Ukely to have been given by God.'^ '' The Jew
«3 Mews, Teter Abelard', p. 27.
" Dialogue, pp. 23-25.
« ibid, p. 29.
<•"•> tbid
f'^  ibid, p . 3 1 .
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concludes on the less rational note that it was not right to question a people's motive
for foUowing a law given to them by God; dther a specific accusation ought be leveUed
against the Law or else criticism must M.^^ In further explanation of the reasons why
Jews keep their faith, the Jew points to the rewards that should foUow for the
hardships undergone on God's behalf These hardships include the sodal
circumstances of the Jews, including their persecution by pagans and Christians
through the ages and their observance of the precepts of the Law, especiaUy
drcumdsion.'^'
Abelard's presentation of the Jew as an inteUigent, reflective commentator
employing reason shows a 'semi-enUghtened tolerance' for the position of the Jews,™
which the Jew highUghts in a long description of theic persecution at the hands of
Christians and MusUms.''' It is unkno-wn but probable that Abelard drew on his
knowledge of contemporary Jewish practice and beUef in depicting the position of
Jews in the Dialogue. UnUke Guibert, Abelard did not seek to marginaUse Jews as
thieves on the basis of their practice of usury. No doubt he was aware of the
circumstances which had forced Jews into money-lending, although Abelard's 'reason'
for Jews not o-wning real property does not mention that they could not take the
Christian oaths which were impUcit in feudal or manorial tenure. Furthermore, his own
recorded contacts with Judaism included once Ustening to a Jew commentating on the
text of the Kings, and his appredation of the Je-wish point of -view was highUghted by
his recommendation to the sisters of the Paraclete that they learn Hebrew in order to
better understand the Scriptures.^ ^ In addition, his personal contacts -with Jews at Paris
indicate he had a certain knowledge of Hebrew.'^
Informal contacts between Je-wish and Christian scholars were becoming
increasingly frequent during this period, and an atmosphere of friendly argumentation
is said to have existed. '^' Whilst Abelard may have had informal contacts -with Jews
along -with other scholars of his era, however, there is Utde to suggest he was able to
utiUse Je-wish authorities for the third and fourth evolutionary stages suggested by
Funkenstein, namely using the Talmud both to criticise the Je-wish beUefs and to
8^ ibid, p. 32.
«' ibid, pp. 32-34.
''" P.K. Spade, in Peter Abelard, Ethical Writings: His Ethics or 'Know Yourself and His Dialogue
between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Chrisdan, P. K. Spade (tr.) and M. M. Adams (intro.),
Hackett, IndianopoUs, 1995, pp. vii-xxvi, xi.
" Dialogue, p . 33.
" B. SmaUey, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1983, pp. 77-79.
' ' A. Grabois, 'The Hebraica Veritas and Jewish-Chrisdan InteUectual Reladons in the Twelfth
Century', Speculum, vol. 50,1975, pp. 613-634, 617 n. 20.
'" C. Roth, 'European Jewry in the Dark Ages: A Re-vised Picture', Hebrew Union College Annual,
vol. 23, no. 2, 1950-1951, pp. 151-169; B. Hamilton, Religion in the Medieval West, Edward Amold,
London, 1986, pp. 145-146. See supra in my discussion of Gilbert Crispin under 'Some Twelfth
century Influences'.
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highHght the superiority of Chrisdan truth. Indeed, the Dialogue does not appear to
manifest an interest in Hebrew wording, or even in tradidonal Jewish bibHcal exegesis.^ ^
b. The philosopher's response
The philosopher responds by way of a lengthy dissertadon as to why the Jewish Law is
contrary to reason. His first argument is that there is no need for the Law when the
natural law is sufficient. In addidon, the precepts of the Jewish Law were imposed on
the Jewish people despite the adequacy of the natural law to provide for salvadon,
without circumcision and other Jewish rites.^ i^  As wül be seen in the second dialogue,
this type of argument was unique in its focus on the natural law as a common
denominator in Chrisdanity and Judaism, whue at the same dme being an irrevocable
divide between the two.
The philosopher's second argument focuses on the sacrament of circumcision
and the lack of necessity for it. Abelard's philosopher argues that Abraham, one of the
foremost Jewish patriarchs, merited the Promised Land and the muldpHcadon of his
seed by virtue of his obedience to God, which was demonstrated by his preparedness
to sacrifice his son, rather than by the rite of circumcision.^' In addidon, circumcision
was an irradonal pracdce since its insdtudon created the threat of damnadon should
someone be uncircumcised; a danger which did not previously exist.''^  This and the
philosopher's previous argument recaU Rupert of Deutz's argument that the
pardcularisdc oudook of Judaism, manifested by the sacrament of circumcision, forced
them to deny the universal oudook of Chrisdanity which offered even Jews — if they
were open to its acceptance — salvadon.7' It also demonstrates a knowledge of the
Torah, though not to the extent evident in Peter Alfonsi's polemics.
A third argument put forward by the philosopher was that the Lord promised
the Jews an earthly reward only, rather than a spiritual reward in the form of
beadtude.^ o Even if the Law granted earthly rewards, the philosopher continued, it was
clear the Jews had not received such benefits, as tesdfied by the Jew's soHloquy on the
hardships his race had suffered. Accordingly, the logic of the philosopher persists, the
Jews have either not obeyed their Law or the one who promised them the reward was
in error.8' In addidon, the philosopher observes that a close study of the Law, and even
'5 H. Leiheschutz, 'The Significance of Judaism in Peter Abelard's Dialogué, The Journal of Jewish
Studies, vol. 12, nos. 1-2,1961, pp. 1-18,13.
T> Dialogue, p. 37.
Il ibid., p. 33.
78 ibid
" Ahulafia, Christians and Jews, p . 126.
8» PL 156, cols 489-528.
8' Dialogue, p. 39.
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the wridngs on Moses, makes no mendon of a promise of beadtude, or non-earthly
reward, for the observances of the Law.*^
The philosopher concludes his discussion of die irradonaHty of Jewish Law, in
comparison to the natural law which preceded it, by pointing out that the 'works', or
precepts of the Mosaic Law have, in any event, been lost, since the Jews have lost the
Promised Land outside which they cannot fulfil the Law. This argument recaUs the
patrisdc and-Judaic wridngs which jusdfied the dispersal of the Jews as an eternal
punishment for killing Christ, exempHfied in Peter Damian's treadse and evident too in
the polemic of Rupert of Deutz.^'
c. The Jew's rebuttal
The Jew responds to the philosopher by explaining the social and reHgious funcdon of
drcumcision.8* Although conceding that the natural law may be sufficient to make the
Judaic Law unnecessary, he points out that circumcision and other precepts of the Law
are useful in protecting the Jewish reHgion and in preventing evñ.**
The Jew, in addidon, rebuts the convendonal cridcism that observance of the
Law confers only material reward.'* In fact the Law, by the sacrament of circumcision,
provided for an eternal covenant between Jews and the Lord, an 'everlasdng reward'.87
Abelard's Jew explains that to pledge eternal beadtude to die Jews as they fled Egypt
would have been superfluous, since they were a 'carnal and rebeUious people' who were
more convinced by material promises made by the Lord.^s Furdiermore, responding to
the philosopher's argument that circumcision is confined only to 'those who are of
Abraham's seed', the Jew observes that this sacrament extends also to 'those who were
not of his stock', namely other Semidc races, such as Arabs.8'
JoHvet has suggested that Abelard's philosopher is himself an Arab, modeUed
on contemporary radonaHst Mohammedan Ibn Badja (Avempace to the Latins) whose
reputadon was known to Peter the Venerable.'^ However, given that the Dialogue was
probably written before diis time, and the contrast in the type of material produced by
the two scholars, Abelard is more Hkely to have obtained a knowledge of die
characterisdcs of this Arab philosopher from other sources. Indeed, it appears he had a
82 ibid, p. 40.
8' See Cohen, 'Jews as the KiUers of Christ', p. 3.
8* Dialogue, pp. 45-46.
85 ibid, pp. 45-46.
»' ibid, pp. 53-55.
87 ibid
88 ibid, p. 58.
89 ¿M, p. 51.
9» JoUvet, 'Abelard et le philosophe (Occident et Islam au douzième siècle)'. Revue de lhistoire des
religions, yo\. 164,1963, pp. 181-189.
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considerable knowledge of Arab learning (including medicine, astrology and
philosophy) from other writers of that era."
Finally, the Jew addresses the issue of the sufficiency of the natural law. In his
opinion, 'the Law itself commands the perfect love of God and neighbour which you
[the philosopher] claim comprises the natural law.''^ Thus he concludes the Law is
perfect in its extension to love of neighbour and God and its sufficiency for salvific
purposes. Here Abelard raises the argument that the essence of the Jewish Law is the
same as the natural law of the philosophers, that is the precept of perfect love.'^
This is the last word of the Jew in his debate with the Christian. He has
seemingly addressed the nub of the argumentation directed against his faith, although
Leibeschutz argues that the Jew might have mentioned that the Law was meant to fit
the Jewish nation for a special religious task, namely the conversion of all gentiles, and
that their exclusivity was by way of a paradigmatic, rather than an exclusionary,
example.'** Such an omission may have been deliberate, as Abelard's philosopher would
have had difficulty in countering this point.
d. The philosopher's final word
The philosopher again responds, but this time in a manner very different from his
previous reply. Dealing with the alleged perfection of the Jewish Law, the philosopher
refutes this on the basis that additions had been made to the Law, particularly in
respect of matters having a clear utility.'^  Abelard foreshadows the discussion of the
degrees of virtue in the second dialogue, when the philosopher questions the rationality
of a Law which proscribes any action which is more or less than the command of
Moses and therefore ostensibly provides that all who observe it are equal in merit.
Furthermore, if indeed the Jewish Law was perfect, there would be no need for the
purification of sins through sacrifices or the external works.'^
Here Abelard is harking back to arguments concerning the carnality and
sensuality of the Jews that had been raised by such polemicists as Rupert of Deutz and
Gilbert Crispin. His philosopher, like Rupert and Gilbert, criticises such beliefs on the
basis of reason, not authority. For what sin does a man incur from suffering a fiow of
semen? asks the philosopher. Or what sin does a woman commit in giving birth? The
Jewish Law deems such acts unclean, and so, the philosopher concludes, the precepts
of the Law relating to purification are 'more adapted to a certain respectability of this
life than to the salvation of the soul'.'^ In addition, obvious 'sins', such as murder or
" Mews, Teter Abelard', p. 41.
'^ Dialogue, p. 56.
" Mews, 'Peter Abelard', p. 33.
'•• Leibeschutz, 'The Significance of Judaism', p. 6.
'^ Dialogue, pp. (i(i-(il.
"i ibid., p. 69.
'7 ibid., p. 70.
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adultery, are punishable by death, rather than providing the chance for salvation. The
philosopher's discussion of sin here lacks the distinction between a wiU to sin, which
was not itself sinful, and the deUberate consent to such a wiU, which was sinful in the
Ethics.^^ Its absence is expUcable on the basis that the aim of the Dialogue is not so
much psychological as doctrinal.
FinaUy, the philosopher confirms his earUer view that the Jewish Law promises
no concept of eternal beatitude. He ends the first conference with a statement that,
even if the Law was received from God, its unchanging nature iU-equips it to deal with
the meaning of virtues discussed in moral philosophy.'' ImpUcidy, this last point is fatal
to the Jew's case, as the absence of a system of promising eternal beatitude can in no
way satisfy the philosopher's quest for supreme truth. Thus Abelard has presented
Judaism as a pre-phUosophic reUgion which precedes the stage of the perfect revelation
of Christianity.
Abelard has used reason, through the mouthpiece of the phñosopher, to
demonstrate that Judaism has no rational basis. His use of reason is, however, less
'Christianised', in the sense of conforming to institutional orthodoxy, than a searching
and detaüed quest for the supreme truth.
2. The Second Conference: the Philosopher and the Christian
In the second conference, Abelard investigates the relationship between the discipline
of ethics, which is the concern of philosophers that deals with how the supreme good
is to be attained, and divinity, which is the concern of Christians and deals with the
supreme good itself'""
This part of the Dialogue pursues more fuUy the idea that philosophers and
Christians share a common commitment to reason, in contrast to Judaism. Abelard,
through the protagonists of the philosopher and the Christian, identifies Christianity as
a truly rational reUgion and rebuts those who considered that the Christian faith
precludes rational inquiry. The phUosopher takes the opportunity to contrast what he
perceives as the reasoned approach of Christianity with the sensuaUty of the Jews:
'Surely the Jews alone, since they are animals and sensual and are imbued with no
philosophy whereby they are able to discuss reasoned arguments, are moved to faith
only by the miracles of external deeds...'.'"'
In addition, the phUosopher criticises those who seek solace for their lack of
skUl, by adopting Pope Gregory's saying: 'Faith has no merit for which human reason
'« D. E. Luscombe (ed.), Peter Abelard's Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 14.
" Dialogue, pp. 64-71. R. W. Southem, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, vol 1
P'û«Wa/w«x,BlackweU,Oxford, 1995,p. 115.
'«I Mews, 'Peter Abelard', p. 27. See the introduction by Adams in Peter Abelard, Hthtcat
Writings, pp. vU-xxvi.
'"' Dialogue, p. 78.
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offers proof .'02 So too, the Christian in the Dialogue fuUy agrees with the complaints of
the philosopher concerning those who refuse to reason about their beUefs.'"' This
echoes a theme Abelard reinforced in the revised introduction to the second book of
his Theolog)! of the 'Schoolmen'.'^°'' In that work, as in the Dialogue,^^^ Abelard pointed out
that if Gregory's axiom meant that rational inquiry into faith was not permissible, there
would logicaUy be no place for the Christian to provide any kind of response or
criticism relating to a matter of faith. In addition, the philosopher echoes passages in
the prologue to Yes and No which critidse bUnd reUance on the judgments of others as
authoritative:
In every philosophical disputation authority is thought to hold last
place or no place at aU to such an extent that it is shameful for those
who trust in their own powers and scorn the refuge of another's
wealth, to adduce arguments based on judgment of a matter [extrinsic
judgment], namely on authority.'"''
Thus, Abelard is arguing not so much for toleration, as for the cause of rational
discussion.
V THE SINGULARITY OF ABELARD
The major difference between the debates in Abelard's Dialogue and those in earUer
dialogues Ues in the role of the philosopher. Whilst refusing to use the philosopher
merely to point out the truth of the Christian position, as in the Anselmian dialogues,
Abelard has him eUcit truth from different points of view.'"'' Similarly, by not placing
the Jew and Christian in direct opposition in the same dialogue, Abelard avoided the
anti-Je-wish dialogue genre exempUfied by Gilbert Crispin and subsequent adversus
Judaeos dialogues. Furthermore, the method Abelard employs is the dialectical paradigm
set out in his preface to Yes and No, where apparendy contradictory statements were
gathered together for appraisal by the reader, -with the sole admonition that no rash
judgment be made about them.'os
^"^ ibid, p. 81.
'w/¿/í/.,p. 81.
IM Mews, 'Peter Abelard', p. 35.
^'^^ Dialogue., pp. 80-Sl.
""^  ibid, p. 83. On the outmodedness of the argument from authority in the twelfth century, see
C. Radding, A World Made by Men: Cognition and Sodety, 400-1200, University of Nor th CaroUna
Press, Chapd HiU, 1985, pp. 204-206, 256.
107 Mews, Teter Abelard', p. 31.
108 Peter Abelard, Sic et Non, B. Boyer and R. McKeon (eds). University of Chicago Press
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The Dialogue also demonstrates how Abelard constructed his argument in the
form of an open-ended dialogue. The method of argument he employed miHtated
against any final soludon. This lack of a fiirm conclusion is characterisdc of his thought,
and is evident in his Theology of the 'Schoolmen', in which he states that he was not
expounding tmth, but 'the sense of our opinion'.'*" Also in the Sic et Non Abelard
encourages the student to regard uncertainty as a chaUenge: 'for by doubting we come
to inquire, and by inquiring we perceive the truth'."" Judgment on the quesdons under
debate is left to the reader, rather than being imposed by Abelard himself This open-
ended quaHty of Abelard's work contrasted sharply with Anselm of Laon and WUHam
of Champeaux, who were celebrated for providing definidve opinions on a wide range
of doctrinal quesdons; and who did not review the wide range of texts and ideas which
Abelard dealt with in his dialogue. Nonetheless, Abelard's underlying inteUectual
concems were fundamentaUy the same as those of AnseHn and Crispin: to lay out a
radonal framework indicating the authority of Chrisdan doctrine.'" Thus, although
Abelard was never expHcidy concerned with the right of alternadve groups to hold
dissenting views, he was prepared to enter into dialogue beyond the tradidonal norms
defined by Chrisdan culture; that is, he dared to engage in dialogue which quesdoned,
and possibly threatened, fundamental Chrisdan doctrine.
The subject matter dealt with by Abelard provides a clear example of how this
greater preparedness for dialogue resulted in more penetrating debate than that of his
contemporaries. Anselm and Gilbert Crispin never quesdoned tradidonal assumpdons
about the sinfulness of human nature."^ In his Why the God Man, Anselm aUowed Boso
to voice his disagreement with the nodon that the devU enjoyed legitimate rights over
mankind but without quesdoning the reaHty of this bondage."^ Abelard's inidal
assumpdon in the Dialogue, in contrast with the tradidonal view of Augustine, was that
humans were not flawed by original sin.""* Thus, the ethical precepts of the Jewish Law
were fundamentaUy the same as those of the natural law observed by the
philosopher."5 Accordingly, Abelard's treatment of sin had die effect of including the
Jew in the dialogue, rather than excluding him from it, and so ensuring discussion
continued past the point of 'safety', in respect to Chrisdan doctrinal debate.
In addidon, the Jewish-Chrisdan disputes of GUbert Crispin and other
Anselmians were preoccupied with demysdfying the doctrine of die Incarnadon against
radonal doubt, whilst Abelard's overwheHning concern was with the supreme good.'"^
"" Mews, 'Peter Abelard', p. 42.
""/M., p. 39.
" ' ibid
"2 ibid
' " Aasehn, Anselm of Canterbury, pp. 76-81.
"•• St Augustine, City of Cod, H. Bettenson (tr.). Penguin, London, 1986, p. 689.
"5 Mews, 'Peter Ahelard', p. 39.
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Accordingly, Abelard drew together the common ground that was the goal of
philosopher, Jew and Chrisdan alike, namely the goal of understanding the supreme
good.
Abelard's beHef in die capacity of radonal discussion to arrive at a greater
understanding of any subject, in pardcular the differences between Jews, Chrisdans and
pagans, demonstrates his enthusiasm for the process of dialogue. Although often
remembered by his crides for his mastery of dialecdc in pubHc disputadon, it would be
incorrect to think that he saw dialecdc as an end in itself. As the Dialogue attempts to
demonstrate, dialecdc was a tool in the service of truth."7 -r^g paper has provided an
analysis of certain Jewish-Chrisdan writings in the first half of the twelfth century in
Western Europe. Like other writers in the AnseHnian tradidon, Abelard sought to lay
out a radonal framework indicating the authority of Chrisdan doctrine. Yet the Dialogue
exhibits unique characterisdcs which distinguish it from the use of 'Chrisdanised
reason' described by Abulafia and make it another 'variety' of reason in and-Judaic
dialogues. Thus, although Abelard's Dialogue seeks to eHcit truth from a synthesis of
philosophy and Chrisdan beHef, this 'reason' is open-ended, miHtadng against a final
answer, and it quesdons tradidonal Chrisdan doctrine. Abelard's work distinguished
itself by its reaHsadon that the search for truth was without end.
' ibid. p. 42.
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